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Abstract. Model learning (a.k.a. active automata learning) is a highly
effective technique for obtaining black-box finite state models of software
components. Thus far, generalization to infinite state systems with inputs
and outputs that carry data parameters has been challenging. Existing
model learning tools for infinite state systems face scalability problems
and can only be applied to restricted classes of systems (register automata
with equality/inequality). In this article, we show how one can boost the
performance of model learning techniques by extracting the constraints
on input and output parameters from a run, and making this grey-box
information available to the learner. More specifically, we provide new
implementations of the tree oracle and equivalence oracle from the RALib
tool, which use the derived constraints. We extract the constraints from
runs of Python programs using an existing tainting library for Python,
and compare our grey-box version of RALib with the existing black-
box version on several benchmarks, including some data structures from
Python’s standard library. Our proof-of-principle implementation results
in almost two orders of magnitude improvement in terms of numbers of
inputs sent to the software system. Our approach, which can be general-
ized to richer model classes, also enables RALib to learn models that are
out of reach of black-box techniques, such as combination locks.
Keywords: Model learning · Active Automata Learning · Register Au-
tomata · RALib · Grey-box · Tainting
1 Introduction
Model learning, also known as active automata learning, is a black-box technique
for constructing state machine models of software and hardware components
from information obtained through testing (i.e., providing inputs and observing
the resulting outputs). Model learning has been successfully used in numerous
applications, for instance for generating conformance test suites of software com-
ponents [13], finding mistakes in implementations of security-critical protocols
[8–10], learning interfaces of classes in software libraries [14], and checking that
? Supported by NWO TOP project 612.001.852 “Grey-box learning of Interfaces for
Refactoring Legacy Software (GIRLS)”.
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a legacy component and a refactored implementation have the same behaviour
[19]. We refer to [17, 20] for surveys and further references.
In many applications it is crucial for models to describe control flow, i.e.,
states of a component, data flow, i.e., constraints on data parameters that are
passed when the component interacts with its environment, as well as the mutual
influence between control flow and data flow. Such models often take the form
of extended finite state machines (EFSMs). Recently, various techniques have
been employed to extend automata learning to a specific class of EFSMs called
register automata, which combine control flow with guards and assignments to
data variables [1, 2, 6].
While these works demonstrate that it is theoretically possible to infer such
richer models, the presented approaches do not scale well and are not yet satisfac-
torily developed for richer classes of models (c.f. [16]): Existing techniques either
rely on manually constructed mappers that abstract the data aspects of input and
output symbols into a finite alphabet, or otherwise infer guards and assignments
from black-box observations of test outputs. The latter can be costly, especially
for models where control flow depends on test on data parameters in input: in
this case, learning an exact guard that separates two control flow branches may
require a large number of queries.
One promising strategy for addressing the challenge of identifying data-flow
constraints is to augment learning algorithms with white-box information ex-
traction methods, which are able to obtain information about the System Under
Test (SUT) at lower cost than black-box techniques. Several researchers have ex-
plored this idea. Giannakopoulou et al. [11] develop an active learning algorithm
that infers safe interfaces of software components with guarded actions. In their
model, the teacher is implemented using concolic execution for the identification
of guards. Cho et al. [7] present MACE an approach for concolic exploration of
protocol behaviour. The approach uses active automata learning for discovering
so-called deep states in the protocol behaviour. From these states, concolic execu-
tion is employed in order to discover vulnerabilities. Similarly, Botincˇan and Babic´
[4] present a learning algorithm for inferring models of stream transducers that
integrates active automata learning with symbolic execution and counterexample-
guided abstraction refinement. They show how the models can be used to verify
properties of input sanitizers in Web applications. Finally, Howar et al. [15]
extend the work of [11] and integrate knowledge obtained through static code
analysis about the potential effects of component method invocations on a compo-
nent’s state to improve the performance during symbolic queries. So far, however,
white-box techniques have never been integrated with learning algorithms for
register automata.
In this article, we present the first active learning algorithm for a general
class of register automata that uses white-box techniques. More specifically, we
show how dynamic taint analysis can be used to efficiently extract constraints
on input and output parameters from a test, and how these constraints can
be used to improve the performance of the SL∗ algorithm of Cassel et al. [6].
The SL∗ algorithm generalizes the classical L∗ algorithm of Angluin [3] and has
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Fig. 1: MAT Framework (Our addition — tainting — in red): Double
arrows indicate possible multiple instances of a query made by an oracle
for a single query by the learner.
been used successfully to learn register automaton models, for instance of Linux
and Windows implementations of TCP [9]. We have implemented the presented
method on top of RALib [5], a library that provides an implementation of the
SL∗ algorithm.
The integration of the two techniques (dynamic taint analysis and learning
of register automata models) can be explained most easily with reference to the
architecture of RALib, shown in Figure 1, which is a variation of the Minimally
Adequate Teacher (MAT) framework of [3]: In the MAT framework, learning is
viewed as a game in which a learner has to infer the behaviour of an unknown
register automaton M by asking queries to a teacher. We postulate M models
the behaviour of a System Under Test (SUT). In the learning phase, the learner
(that is, SL∗) is allowed to ask questions to the teacher in the form of tree queries
(TQs) and the teacher responds with symbolic decision trees (SDTs). In order to
construct these SDTs, the teacher uses a tree oracle, which queries the SUT with
membership queries (MQs) and receives a yes/no reply to each. Typically, the tree
oracle asks multiple MQs to answer a single tree query in order to infer causal
impact and flow of data values. Based on the answers on a number of tree queries,
the learner constructs a hypothesis in the form of a register automaton H. The
learner submits H as an equivalence query (EQ) to the teacher, asking whether
H is equivalent to the SUT model M. The teacher uses an equivalence oracle
to answer equivalence queries. Typically, the equivalence oracle asks multiple
MQs to answer a single equivalence query. If, for all membership queries, the
output produced by the SUT is consistent with hypothesis H, the answer to the
equivalence query is ‘Yes’ (indicating learning is complete). Otherwise, the answer
‘No’ is provided, together with a counterexample (CE) that indicates a difference
between H andM. Based on this CE, learning continues. In this extended MAT
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framework, we have constructed new implementations of the tree oracle and
equivalence oracle that leverage the constraints on input and output parameters
that are imposed by a program run: dynamic tainting is used to extract the
constraints on parameters that are encountered during a run of a program. Our
implementation learns models of Python programs, using an existing tainting
library for Python [12]. Effectively, the combination of the SL∗ with our new tree
and equivalence oracles constitutes a grey-box learning algorithm, since we only
give the learner partial information about the internal structure of the SUT.
We compare our grey-box tree and equivalence oracles with the existing black-
box versions of these oracles on several benchmarks, including Python’s queue
and set modules. Our proof-of-concept implementation3 results in almost two
orders of magnitude improvement in terms of numbers of inputs sent to the
software system. Our approach, which generalises to richer model classes, also
enables RALib to learn models that are completely out of reach for black-box
techniques, such as combination locks.
Outline: Section 2 contains preliminaries; Section 3 discusses tainting in our
Python SUTs; Section 4 contains the algorithms we use to answer TQs using
tainting and the definition for the tainted equivalence oracle needed to learn
combination lock automata; Section 5 contains the experimental evaluation of
our technique; and Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminary definitions and constructions
This section contains the definitions and constructions necessary to understand
active automata learning for models with dataflow. We first define the concept
of a structure, followed by guards, data languages, register automata, and finally
symbolic decision trees.
Definition 1 (Structure). A structure S = 〈R,D,R〉 is a triple where R is
a set of relation symbols, each equipped with an arity, D is an infinite domain
of data values, and R contains a distinguished n-ary relation rR ⊆ Dn for each
n-ary relation symbol r ∈ R.
In the remainder of this article, we fix a structure S = 〈R,D,R〉, where R
contains a binary relation symbol = and unary relation symbols = c, for each
c contained in a finite set C of constant symbols, D equals the set N of natural
numbers, =R is interpreted as the equality predicate on N, and to each symbol
c ∈ C a natural number nc is associated such that (= c)R = {nc}.
Guards are a restricted type of Boolean formulas that may contain relation
symbols from R.
Definition 2 (Guards). We postulate a countably infinite set V = {v1, v2, . . .}
of variables. In addition, there is a variable p 6∈ V that will play a special role
as formal parameter of input symbols; we write V+ = V ∪ {p}. A guard is
3 Available at https://bitbucket.org/toonlenaerts/taintralib/src/basic.
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a conjunction of relation symbols and negated relation symbols over variables.
Formally, the set of guards is inductively defined as follows:
– If r ∈ R is an n-ary relation symbol and x1, . . . , xn are variables from V+,
then r(x1, . . . , xn) and ¬r(x1, . . . , xn) are guards.
– If g1 and g2 are guards then g1 ∧ g2 is a guard.
Let X ⊂ V+. We say that g is a guard over X if all variables that occur in g are
contained in X. A variable renaming is a function σ : X → V+. If g is a guard
over X then g[σ] is the guard obtained by replacing each variable x in g by σ(x).
Next, we define the notion of a data language. For this, we fix a finite set of
actions Σ. A data symbol α(d) is a pair consisting of an action α ∈ Σ and a data
value d ∈ D. While relations may have arbitrary arity, we will assume that all
actions have an arity of one to ease notation and simplify the text. A data word
is a finite sequence of data symbols, and a data language is a set of data words.
We denote concatenation of data words w and w′ by w ·w′, where w is the prefix
and w′ is the suffix. Acts(w) denotes the sequence of actions α1α2 . . . αn in w,
and Vals(w) denotes the sequence of data values d1d2 . . . dn in w. We refer to a
sequence of actions in Σ∗ as a symbolic suffix. If w is a symbolic suffix then we
write JwK for the set of data words u with Acts(u) = w.
Data languages may be represented by register automaton, defined below.
Definition 3 (Register Automaton). A Register Automaton (RA) is a tuple
M = (L, l0,X , Γ, λ) where
– L is a finite set of locations, with l0 as the initial location;
– X maps each location l ∈ L to a finite set of registers X (l);
– Γ is a finite set of transitions, each of the form 〈l, α(p), g, pi, l′〉, where
• l, l′ are source and target locations respectively,
• α(p) is a parametrised action,
• g is a guard over X (l) ∪ {p}, and
• pi is an assignment mapping from X (l′) to X (l) ∪ {p}; and
– λ maps each location in L to either accepting (+) or rejecting (−).
We require that M is deterministic in the sense that for each location l ∈ L
and input symbol α ∈ Σ, the conjunction of the guards of any pair of distinct
α-transitions with source l is not satisfiable. M is completely specified if for all
α-transitions out of a location, the disjunction of the guards of the α-transitions is
a tautology. M is said to be simple if there are no registers in the initial location,
i.e., X (l0) = ∅. In this text, all RAs are assumed to be completely specified and
simple, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Locations l ∈ L with λ(l) = + are called
accepting, and locations with λ(l) = − rejecting.
Example 1 (FIFO-buffer). The register automaton displayed in Figure 2 models
a FIFO-buffer with capacity 2. It has three accepting locations l0, l1 and l2
(denoted by a double circle), and one rejecting “sink” location l3 (denoted by a
single circle). Function X assigns the empty set of registers to locations l0 and
l3, singleton set {x} to location l1, and set {x, y} to l2.
6 B. Garhewal et al.
l0start l1 l2
l3
Push(p)
x := p
Pop(p)
Push(p)
y := p
p = x
Pop(p)
p 6= x
Pop(p)
p = x
Pop(p)
x := y
p 6= x
Pop(p)
Push(p)
Push(p)
Pop(p)
Fig. 2: FIFO-buffer with a capacity of 2 modeled as a register automaton.
2.1 Semantics of a RA
We now formalise the semantics of an RA. A valuation of a set of variables X
is a function ν : X → D that assigns data values to variables in X. If ν is a
valuation of X and g is a guard over X then ν |= g is defined inductively by:
– ν |= r(x1, . . . , xn) iff (ν(x1), . . . , ν(xn)) ∈ rR
– ν |= ¬r(x1, . . . , xn) iff (ν(x1), . . . , ν(xn)) 6∈ rR
– ν |= g1 ∧ g2 iff ν |= g1 and ν |= g2
A state of a RA M = (L, l0,X , Γ, λ) is a pair 〈l, ν〉, where l ∈ L is a location
and ν : X (l) −→ D is a valuation of the set of registers at location l. A run of M
over data word w = α1(d1) . . . αn(dn) is a sequence
〈l0, ν0〉 α1(d1),g1,pi1−−−−−−−−→ 〈l1, ν1〉 . . . 〈ln−1, νn−1〉 αn(dn),gn,pin−−−−−−−−−→ 〈ln, νn〉,
where
– for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n, 〈li, νi〉 is a state (with l0 the initial location),
– for each 0 < i ≤ n, 〈li−1, αi(p), gi, pii, li〉 ∈ Γ such that ιi  gi and νi = ιi ◦pii,
where ιi = νi−1 ∪ {[p 7→ di]} extends νi−1 by mapping p to di.
A run is accepting if λ(ln) = +, else rejecting. The language of M , notation
L(M ), is the set of words w such that M has an accepting run over w. Word w
is accepted (rejected) under valuation ν0 if M has an accepting (rejecting) run
that starts in state 〈l0, νo〉.
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{x1, x2}
Pop(p)
p = x1
Pop(p)
p 6= x1
Pop(p)
p = x2
Pop(p)
p 6= x2 Pop(p)
Fig. 3: SDT for prefix Push(5) Push(7) and (symbolic) suffix Pop Pop.
Example 2. Consider the FIFO-buffer example from Figure 2. This RA has a
run
〈l0, ν0 = []〉 Push(7),g1≡>,pi1=[x 7→p]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 〈l1, ν1 = [x 7→ 7]〉
Push(7),g2≡>,pi2=[x 7→x,y 7→p]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 〈l2, ν2 = [x 7→ 7, y 7→ 7]〉
Pop(7),g3≡p=x,pi3=[x 7→y]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 〈l1, ν3 = [x 7→ 7]〉
Push(5),g4≡>,pi4=[x 7→x,y 7→p]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 〈l2, ν4 = [x 7→ 7, y 7→ 5]〉
Pop(7),g5≡p=x,pi5=[x 7→y]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 〈l1, ν5 = [x 7→ 5]〉
Pop(5),g6≡p=x,pi6=[]−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 〈l0, ν6 = []〉
and thus the trace is Push(7) Push(7) Pop(7) Push(5) Pop(7) Pop(5). y
2.2 Symbolic Decision Tree
The SL∗ algorithm uses tree queries in place of membership queries. The argu-
ments of a tree query are a prefix data word u and a symbolic suffix w, i.e., a data
word with uninstantiated data parameters. The response to a tree query is a so
called symbolic decision tree (SDT), which has the form of tree-shaped register
automaton that accepts/rejects suffixes obtained by instantiating data param-
eters in one of the symbolic suffixes. Let us illustrate this on the FIFO-buffer
example from Figure 2 for the prefix Push(5) Push(7) and the symbolic suffix
Pop Pop. The acceptance/rejection of suffixes obtained by instantiating data
parameters after Push(5) Push(7) can be represented by the SDT in Figure 3. In
the initial location, values 5 and 7 from the prefix are stored in registers x1 and
x2, respectively. Thus, SDTs will generally not be simple RAs. Moreover, since
the leaves of an SDT have no outgoing transitions, they are also not completely
specified. We use the convention that register xi stores the ith data value. Thus,
initially, register x1 contains value 5 and register x2 contains value 7. The initial
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transitions in the SDT contain an update x3 := p, and the final transitions an
update x4 := p. For readability, these updates are not displayed in the diagram.
The SDT accepts suffixes of form Pop(d1) Pop(d2) iff d1 equals the value stored
in register x1, and d2 equals the data value stored in register x2.
The formal definitions of an SDT and the notion of a tree oracle are presented
in Appendix A. For a more detailed discussion of SDTs we refer to [6].
3 Tainting
We postulate that the behaviour of the SUT (in our case: a Python program)
can be modeled by a register automatonM . In a black-box setting, observations
on the SUT will then correspond to words from the data language of M . In
this section, we will describe the additional observations that a learner can make
in a grey-box setting, where the constraints on the data parameters that are
imposed within a run become visible. In this setting, observations of the learner
will correspond to what we call tainted words of M . Tainting semantics is an
extension of the standard semantics in which each input value is “tainted” with
a unique marker from V. In a data word w = α1(d1)α2(d2) . . . αn(dn), the first
data value d1 is tainted with marker v1, the second data value d2 with v2, etc.
While the same data value may occur repeatedly in a data word, all the markers
are different.
3.1 Semantics of Tainting
A tainted state of a RA M = (L, l0,X , Γ, λ) is a triple 〈l, ν, ζ〉, where l ∈ L
is a location, ν : X (l) → D is a valuation, and ζ : X (l) → V is a function
that assigns a marker to each register of l. A tainted run of M over data word
w = α1(d1) . . . αn(dn) is a sequence
τ = 〈l0, ν0, ζ0〉 α1(d1),g1,pi1−−−−−−−−→ 〈l1, ν1, ζ1〉 . . . 〈ln−1, νn−1, ζn−1〉 αn(dn),gn,pin−−−−−−−−−→ 〈ln, νn, ζn〉,
where
– 〈l0, ν0〉 α1(d1),g1,pi1−−−−−−−−→〈l1, ν1〉 . . .〈ln−1, νn−1〉 αn(dn),gn,pin−−−−−−−−−→〈ln, νn〉 is a run ofM ,
– for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n, 〈li, νi, ζi〉 is a tainted state,
– for each 0 < i ≤ n, ζi = κi ◦ pii, where κi = ζi−1 ∪ {(p, vi)}.
The tainted word of τ is the sequence w = α1(d1)G1α2(d2)G2 · · ·αn(dn)Gn,
where Gi = gi[κi], for 0 < i ≤ n. We define constraintsM (τ) = [G1, . . . , Gn].
Let w = α1(d1) . . . αn(dn) be a data word. Since register automata are deter-
ministic, there is a unique tainted run τ over w. We define constraintsM (w) =
constraintsM (τ), that is, the constraints associated to a data word are the con-
straints of the unique tainted run that corresponds to it. In the untainted setting
a membership query for data word w leads to a response “yes” if w ∈ L(M ), and a
response “no” otherwise, but in a tainted setting the predicates constraintsM (w)
are also included in the response, and provide additional information that the
learner may use.
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Example 3. Consider the FIFO-buffer example from Figure 2. This RA has a
tainted run
〈l0, [], []〉 Push(7)−−−−→〈l1, [x 7→ 7], [x 7→ v1]〉 Push(7)−−−−→ 〈l2, [x 7→ 7, y 7→ 7], [x 7→ v1, y 7→ v2]〉
Pop(7)−−−−→ 〈l1, [x 7→ 7], [x 7→ v2]〉 Push(5)−−−−→ 〈l2, [x 7→ 7, y 7→ 5], [x 7→ v2, y 7→ v4]〉
Pop(7)−−−−→ 〈l1, [x 7→ 5], [y 7→ v4]〉 Pop(5)−−−−→ 〈l0, [], []〉
(For readability, guards gi and assignments pii have been left out.) The constraints
in the corresponding tainted trace can be computed as follows:
κ1 = [p 7→ v1] G1 ≡ >[κ1] ≡ >
κ2 = [x 7→ v1, p 7→ v2] G2 ≡ >[κ2] ≡ >
κ3 = [x 7→ v1, y 7→ v2, p 7→ v3] G3 ≡ (p = x)[κ3] ≡ v3 = v1
κ4 = [x 7→ v2, p 7→ v4] G4 ≡ >[κ4] ≡ >
κ5 = [x 7→ v2, y 7→ v4, p 7→ v5] G5 ≡ (p = x)[κ5] ≡ v5 = v2
κ6 = [x 7→ v4, p 7→ v6] G6 ≡ (p = x)[κ6] ≡ v6 = v4
and thus the tainted word is:
Push(7) > Push(7) > Pop(7) v3 = v1 Push(5) > Pop(7) v5 = v2 Pop(5) v6 = v4,
and the corresponding list of constraints is [>,>, v3 = v1,>, v5 = v2, v6 = v4]. y
Various techniques can be used to observe tainted traces, for instance symbolic
and concolic execution. In this work, we have used a library called “taintedstr”
to achieve tainting in Python and make tainted traces available to the learner.
3.2 Tainting in Python
Tainting in Python is achieved by using a library called “taintedstr”4, which
implements a “tstr” (tainted string) class. We do not discuss the entire imple-
mentation in detail, but only introduce the portions relevant to our work. The
“tstr” class works by operator overloading: each operator is overloaded to record
its own invocation. The tstr class overloads the implementation of the “ eq ”
(equality) method in Python’s str class, amongst others. In this text, we only
consider the equality method. A tstr object x can be considered as a triple
〈o, t, cs〉, where o is the (base) string object, t is the taint value associated with
string o, and cs is a set of comparisons made by x with other objects, where
each comparison c ∈ cs is a triple 〈f, a, b〉 with f the name of the binary method
invoked on x, a a copy of x, and b the argument supplied to f .
Each a method f in the tstr class is an overloaded implementation of the
relevant (base) method f as follows:
4 See [12] and https://github.com/vrthra/taintedstr.
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1 def f(self , other):
2 self.cs.add((m._name_ , self , other))
3 return self.o.f(other) # ‘o’ is the base string
We present a short example of how such an overloaded method would work below:
Example 4 (tstr tainting). Consider two tstr objects: x1 = 〈“1”, 1, ∅〉 and
x2 = 〈“1”, 2, ∅〉. Calling x1 == x2 returns True as x1.o = x2.o. As a side-effect
of f , the set of comparisons x1.cs is updated with the triple c = 〈“ eq ”, x1, x2〉.
We may then confirm that x1 is compared to x2 by checking the taint values of
the variables in comparison c: x1.t = 1 and x2.t = 2.
Note, our approach to tainting limits the recorded information to operations
performed on a tstr object. y
Example 5 (Complicated Comparison). Consider the following snippet, where
x1, x2, x3 are tstr objects with 1, 2, 3 as taint values respectively:
1 if not (x_1 == x_2 or (x_2 != x_3)):
2 # do something
If the base values of x1 and x2 are equal, the Python interpreter will “short-
circuit” the if-statement and the second condition, x2 6= x3, will not be evaluated.
Thus, we only obtain one comparison: x1 = x2. On the other hand, if the base
values of x1 and x2 are not equal, the interpreter will not short-circuit, and both
comparisons will be recorded as {x2 = x3, x1 6= x2}. While the comparisons are
stored as a set, from the perspective of the tainted trace, the guard(s) is a single
conjunction: x2 = x3 ∧ x1 6= x2. However, the external negation operation will
not be recorded by any of the tstr objects: the negation was not performed on
the tstr objects. y
4 Learning Register Automata using Tainting
Given an SUT and a tree query, we generate an SDT in the following steps:
(i) construct a characteristic predicate of the tree query (Algorithm 1) using
membership and guard queries, (ii) transform the characteristic predicate into
an SDT (Algorithm 2), and (iii) minimise the obtained SDT (Algorithm 3).
4.1 Tainted Tree Oracle
Construction of Characteristic Predicate For u = α(d1) · · ·αk(dk) a data
word, νu denotes the valuation of {x1, . . . , xk} with νu(xi) = di, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Suppose u is a prefix and w = αk+1 · · ·αk+n is a symbolic suffix. Then H is a
characteristic predicate for u and w inM if, for each valuation ν of {x1, . . . , xk+n}
that extends νu,
ν |= H ⇐⇒ α1(ν(x1)) · · ·αk+n(ν(xk+n)) ∈ L(M ),
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Algorithm 1: ComputeCharacteristicPredicate
Data: A tree query consisting of prefix u = α1(d1) · · ·αk(dk) and symbolic suffix
w = αk+1 · · ·αk+n
Result: A characteristic predicate for u and w in M
1 G := >, H := ⊥, V := {x1, . . . , xk+n}
2 while ∃ valuation ν for V that extends νu such that ν |= G do
3 ν := valuation for V that extends νu such that ν |= G
4 z := α1(ν(x1)) · · ·αk+n(ν(xk+n)) // Construct membership query
5 I :=
∧k+n
i=k+1 constraintsM (z)[i] // Constraints resulting from query
6 if z ∈ L(M ) then // Result query ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’
7 H := H ∨ I
8 G := G ∧ ¬I
9 end
10 return H
that is, H characterizes the data words u′ with Acts(u′) = w such that u · u′
is accepted by M . In the case of the FIFO-buffer example from Figure 2, a
characteristic predicate for prefix Push(5) Push(7) and symbolic suffix Pop Pop is
x3 = x1 ∧ x4 = x2. A characteristic predicate for the empty prefix and symbolic
suffix Pop is ⊥, since this trace will inevitably lead to the sink location l3 and
there are no accepting words.
Algorithm 1 shows how a characteristic predicate may be computed by sys-
tematically exploring all the (finitely many) paths ofM with prefix u and suffix
w using tainted membership queries. During the execution of Algorithm 1, pred-
icate G describes the part of the parameter space that still needs to be explored,
whereas H is the characteristic predicate for the part of the parameter space that
has been covered. We use the notation H ≡ T to indicate syntactic equivalence,
and H = T to indicate logical equivalence. Note, if there exists no parameter
space to be explored (i.e., w is empty) and u ∈ L(M ), the algorithm returns
H ≡⊥ ∨> (as the empty conjunction equals >).
Example 6 (Algorithm 1). Consider the FIFO-buffer example and the tree query
with prefix Push(5) Push(7) and symbolic suffix Pop Pop. After the prefix location
l2 is reached. From there, three paths are possible with actions Pop Pop: l2l3l3,
l2l1l3 and l2l1l0. We consider an example run of Algorithm 1.
Initially, G0 ≡ > and H0 ≡⊥. Let ν1 = [x1 7→ 5, x2 7→ 7, x3 7→ 1, x4 7→ 1].
Then ν1 extends νu and ν1 |= G0. The resulting tainted run corresponds to path
l2l3l3 and so the tainted query gives path constraint I1 ≡ x3 6= x1 ∧>. Since the
tainted run is rejecting, H1 ≡⊥ and G1 ≡ > ∧ ¬I1.
In the next iteration, we set ν2 = [x1 7→ 5, x2 7→ 7, x3 7→ 5, x4 7→ 1]. Then ν2
extends νu and ν2 |= G1. The resulting tainted run corresponds to path l2l1l3
and so the tainted query gives path constraint I2 ≡ x3 = x1 ∧ x4 6= x2. Since the
tainted run is rejecting, H2 ≡⊥ and G2 ≡ > ∧ ¬I1 ∧ ¬I2.
In the final iteration, we set ν3 = [x1 7→ 5, x2 7→ 7, x3 7→ 5, x4 7→ 7]. Then ν3
extends νu and ν3 |= G2. The resulting tainted run corresponds to path l2l1l0
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and the tainted query gives path constraint I3 ≡ x3 = x1 ∧ x4 = x2. Now the
tainted run is accepting, so H3 ≡⊥ ∨I3 and G3 = >∧¬I1 ∧ ¬I2 ∧ ¬I3. As G3 is
unsatisfiable, the algorithm terminates and returns characteristic predicate H3.
Construction of a non-minimal SDT For each tree query with prefix u and
symbolic suffix w, the corresponding characteristic predicate H is sufficient to
construct an SDT using Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: SDTConstructor
Data: Characteristic predicate H, index n = k + 1,
Number of suffix parameters N
Result: Non-minimal SDT T
1 if n = k +N + 1 then
2 l0 := SDT node
3 z := if H ⇐⇒ ⊥ then − else + // Value λ for leaf node of the SDT
4 return 〈 {l0} , l0, [l0 7→ ∅],∅, [l0 7→ z]〉 // RA with single location
5 else
6 T := SDT node
7 It := {i | xn  xi ∈ H, n > i} // xi may be a parameter or a constant
8 if It is ∅ then
9 t := SDTConstructor(H,n+ 1, N) // No guards present
10 Add t with guard > to T
11 else
12 g :=
∧
i∈It xn 6= xi // Disequality guard case
13 H ′ :=
∨
f∈H f ∧ g if f ∧ g is satisfiable else ⊥ // f is a disjunct
14 t′ := SDTConstructor(H ′, n+ 1, N)
15 Add t′ with guard g to T
16 for i ∈ It do
17 g := xn = xi // Equality guard case
18 H ′ :=
∨
f∈H f ∧ g if f ∧ g is satisfiable else ⊥
19 t′ := SDTConstructor(H ′, n+ 1, N)
20 Add t′ with guard g to T
21 end
22 return T
Algorithm 2 proceeds in the following manner: for a symbolic action α (xn)
with parameter xn, construct the potential set It (lines 6 & 7), that is, the set
of parameters to which xn is compared to in H. For line 7, recall that H is a
DNF formula, hence each literal xj  xk is considered in the set comprehension,
rather than the conjunctions making up the predicate H. Each element xi ∈ It
can be either a formal parameter in the tree query or a constant ci ∈ C from our
chosen structure. Using It, we can construct the guards as follows:
– Disequality guard: The disequality guard will be g :=
∧
{i∈It} xn 6= xi.
We can then check which guards in H are still satisfiable with the addition
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of g and constructs the predicate H ′ for the next call of Algorithm 2 (lines
13–16).
– Equality guard (s): For each parameter xi for i ∈ It, the equality guard
will be g := xn = xi. We can then check which guards in H are still satisfiable
with the addition of g and this becomes the predicate H ′ for the next call of
Algorithm 2 (lines 18–21).
At the base case (lines 1− 4), there are no more parameters remaining and
we return a non-accepting leaf if H = ⊥, otherwise accepting. As mentioned,
at each non-leaf location l of the SDT T returned by Algorithm 2, there exists
a potential set It. For each parameter xi, we know that there is a comparison
between xi and xn in the SUT.
Example 7 (Algorithm 2). Consider a characteristic predicate H ≡ I1∨I2∨I3∨I4,
where I1 ≡ x2 6= x1 ∧ x3 6= x1, I2 ≡ x2 = x1 ∧ x3 6= x1, I3 ≡ x2 6= x1 ∧ x3 = x1,
I4 ≡ x2 = x1 ∧ x3 = x1. We discuss only the construction of the sub-tree rooted
at node s21 for the SDT visualised in Figure 4a; the construction of the remainder
is similar.
Initially, xn = xk+1 = x2. Potential set It for x2 is {x1} as H contains the
literals x2 = x1 and x2 6= x1. Consider the construction of the equality guard
g := x2 = x1. The new characteristic predicate is H ′ ≡ (I2 ∧ g) ∨ (I4 ∧ g), as I1
and I3 are unsatisfiable when conjugated with g.
For the next call, with n = 3, the current variable is x3, with predicate
H = H ′ (from the parent instance). We obtain the potential set for x3 as
{x1}. The equality guard is g′ := x3 = x1 with the new characteristic predicate
H ′′ ≡ I4∧g∧g′, i.e.,H ′′ ⇐⇒ x2 = x1∧x3 = x1 (note, I2∧g∧g′ is unsatisfiable).
In the next call, we have n = 4, thus we compute a leaf. As H ′′ is not ⊥, we return
an accepting leaf t. The disequality guard is g′′ := x3 6= x1 with characteristic
predicate H ′′′ ⇐⇒ x2 = x1 ∧ x3 = x1 ∧ x3 6= x1 ⇐⇒ ⊥. In the next call, we
have n = 4, and we return a non-accepting leaf t′. The two trees t and t′ are
added as sub-trees with their respective guards g′ and g′′ to a new tree rooted
at node s21 (see Figure 4a). y
SDT Minimisation Example 7 showed a characteristic predicate H containing
redundant comparisons, resulting in the non-minimal SDT in Figure 4a. We
use Algorithm 3 to minimise the SDT in Figure 4a to the SDT in Figure 4b.
We present an example of the application of Algorithm 3, shown for the SDT
of Figure 4a. Figure 4a visualises a non-minimal SDT T , where s20 and s21 (in red)
are essentially “duplicates” of each other: the sub-tree for node s20 is isomorphic
to the sub-tree for node s21 under the relabelling “x2 = x1”. We indicate this
relabelling using the notation T [s20]〈x1, x2〉 and the isomorphism relation under
the relabelling as T [s20]〈x1, x2〉 ' T [s21]. Algorithm 3 accepts the non-minimal
SDT of Figure 4a and produces the equivalent minimal SDT in Figure 4b. Nodes
s20 and s21 are merged into one node, s2, marked in green. We can observe
that both SDTs still encode the same decision tree. With Algorithm 3, we have
completed our tainted tree oracle, and can now proceed to the tainted equivalence
oracle.
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Algorithm 3: MinimiseSDT
Data: Non-minimal SDT T , current index n
Result: Minimal SDT T ′
1 if T is a leaf then // Base case
2 return T
3 else
4 T ′ := SDT node
// Minimise the lower levels
5 for guard g with associated sub-tree t in T do
6 Add guard g with associated sub-tree MinimiseSDT(t, n+ 1) to T ′
7 end
// Minimise the current level
8 I := Potential set of root node of T
9 t′ := disequality sub-tree of T with guard ∧
i∈I xn 6= xi
10 I ′ := ∅
11 for i ∈ I do
12 t := sub-tree of T with guard xn = xi
13 if t′〈xi, xn〉 6' t or t′〈xi, xn〉 is undefined then
14 I ′ := I ′ ∪ {xi}
15 Add guard xn = xi with corresponding sub-tree t to T ′
16 end
17 Add guard
∧
i∈I′ xn 6= xi with corresponding sub-tree t′ to T ′
18 return T ′
4.2 Tainted Equivalence Oracle
The tainted equivalence oracle (TEO), similar to its non-tainted counterpart,
accepts a hypothesis H and verifies whetherH is equivalent to register automaton
M that models the SUT. If H and M are equivalent, the oracle replies “yes”,
otherwise it returns “no” together with a CE. The RandomWalk Equivalence
Oracle in RALib constructs random traces in order to find a CE.
Definition 4 (Tainted Equivalence Oracle). For a given hypothesis H, max-
imum word length n, and an SUT S, a tainted equivalence oracle is a function
OE(H, n,S) for all tainted traces w of S where |w| ≤ n, OE(H, n,S) returns w
if w ∈ L(H) ⇐⇒ w ∈ L(S) is false, and ‘Yes’ otherwise.
The TEO is similar to the construction of the characteristic predicate to find a
CE: we randomly generate a symbolic suffix of specified length n (with an empty
prefix), and construct a predicate H for the query. For each trace w satisfying a
guard in H, we confirm whether w ∈ L(H) ⇐⇒ w ∈ L(M). If false, w is a CE.
If no w is false, then we randomly generate another symbolic suffix. In practise,
we bound the number of symbolic suffixes to generate. Example 8 presents a
scenario of a combination lock automaton that can be learned (relatively easily)
using a TEO but cannot be handled by normal oracles.
Example 8 (Combination Lock RA). A combination lock is a type of RA which
requires a sequence of specific inputs to ‘unlock’. Figure 5 presents an RA C
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s20 s21
{x1}
x2 6= x1 x2 = x1
x3 6= x1 x3 6= x2 x3 = x2x3 = x1
(a) Non-minimal SDT T
s2
{x1}
> : x2
x3 6= x1 x3 = x1
(b) Minimal SDT T ′
Fig. 4: SDT Minimisation: Redundant nodes (in red, left SDT) are merged
together (in green, right SDT).
l0start l1 l2 l3 l4
α(p) | p=1
∅
α(p) | p=9
∅
α(p) | p=6
∅
α(p) | p=2
∅
β
α(p) | p 6=1
∅
α(p) | p 6=9
∅
α(p) | p 6=6
∅
α(p) | p6=2
∅
Fig. 5: Combination Lock C : Sequence α(1)α(9)α(6)α(2) unlocks the
automaton. Error transitions (from l3 – l1 to l0) have been ‘merged’ for
conciseness. The sink state has not been drawn.
with a ‘4-digit’ combination lock that can be unlocked by the sequence w =
α(c0)α(c1)α(c2)α(c3), where {c0, c1, c2, c3} are constants. Consider a case where
a hypothesis H is being checked for equivalence against the RA C with w 6∈
L(H). While it would be difficult for a normal equivalence oracle to generate the
word w randomly; the tainted equivalence oracle will record at every location
the comparison of input data value p with some constant ci and explore all
corresponding guards at the location, eventually constructing the word w.
For the combination lock automaton, we may note that as the ‘depth’ of the
lock increases, the possibility of randomly finding a CE decreases. y
5 Experimental Evaluation
We have used stubbed versions of the Python FIFO-Queue and Set modules5
for learning the FIFO and Set models, while the Combination Lock automata
were constructed manually. Source code for all other models was obtained by
5 From Python’s queue module and standard library, respectively.
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translating existing benchmarks from [18] (see also automata.cs.ru.nl) to Python
code. We also utilise a ‘reset’ operation: A ‘reset’ operation brings an SUT back to
its initial state, and is counted as an ‘input’ for our purposes. Furthermore, each
experiment was repeated 30 times with different random seeds. Each experiment
was bounded according to the following constraints: learning phase: 109 inputs
and 5 × 107 resets; testing phase: 109 inputs and 5 × 104 resets; length of the
longest word during testing: 50; and a ten-minute timeout for the learner to
respond.
Figure 6 gives an overview of our experimental results. We use the notation
‘TTO’ to represent ‘Tainted Tree Oracle’ (with similar labels for the other oracles).
In the figure, we can see that as the size of the container increases, the difference
between the fully tainted version (TTO+TEO, in blue) and the completely
untainted version (NTO+NEO, in red) increases. In the case where only a tainted
tree oracle is used (TTO+NEO, in green), we see that it is following the fully
tainted version closely (for the FIFO models) and is slightly better in the case
of the SET models.
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Fig. 6: Benchmark plots: Number of symbols used with tainted oracles
(blue and green) are generally lower than with normal oracles (red and
orange). Note that the y-axis is log-scaled. Additionally, normal oracles
are unable to learn the Combination Lock and Repetition automata and
are hence not plotted.
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The addition of the TEO gives a conclusive advantage for the Combination
Lock and Repetition benchmarks. The addition of the TTO by itself results
in significantly fewer number of symbols, even without the tainted equivalence
oracle (TTO v/s NTO, compare the green and red lines). With the exception of
the Combination Lock and Repetition benchmarks, the TTO+TEO combination
does not provide vastly better results in comparison to the TTO+NEO results,
however, it is still (slightly) better. We note that — as expected — the NEO does
not manage to provide CEs for the Repetition and Combination Lock automata.
The TEO is therefore much more useful for finding CEs in SUTs which utilise
constants. For complete details of the data used to produce the plots, please refer
to Appendix B.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this article, we have presented an integration of dynamic taint analysis, a white-
box technique for tracing data flow, and register automata learning, a black-box
technique for inferring behavioral models of components. The combination of
the two methods improves upon the state-of-the-art in terms of class of systems
for which models can be generated and in terms of performance: Tainting makes
it possible to infer data-flow constraints even in instances with a high essential
complexity (e.g., in the case of so-called combination locks). Our implementation
outperforms pure black-box learning by two orders of magnitude with a growing
impact in the presence of multiple data parameters and registers. Both improve-
ments are important steps towards the applicability of model learning in practice
as they will help scaling to industrial use cases.
At the same time our evaluation shows the need for further improvements:
Currently, the SL∗ algorithm uses symbolic decision trees and tree queries globally,
a well-understood weakness of learning algorithms that are based on observation
tables. It also uses individual tree oracles each type of operation and relies on
syntactic equivalence of decision trees. A more advanced learning algorithm
for extended finite state machines will be able to consume fewer tree queries,
leverage semantic equivalence of decision trees. Deeper integration with white-
box techniques could enable the analysis of many (and more involved) operations
on data values.
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Appendix A Tree Oracle for Equalities
In this appendix, we prove that the tainted tree oracle generates SDTs which
are isomorphic to the SDTs generated by the normal tree oracle as defined in [6].
In order to do so, we first introduce the constructs used by Cassel et al. [6] for
generating SDTs. We begin with some preliminaries:
For a word u with Vals(u) = d1 . . . dk, we define a potential of u. The potential
of u, written as pot(u), is the set of indices i ∈ {1, . . . , k} for which there exists no
j ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that j > i and di = dj . The concept of potential essentially
allows unique access to a data value, abstracting away from the concrete position
of a data value in a word. For a guard g defined over V+ for a word u with
Vals(u) = d1, . . . dk, a representative data value dgu is a data value s.t. ν(u) ∪
{[p 7→ dgu]}  g. Furthermore, for a word w = α · w′ (where w′ may be ) , w′
can be represented as α-1w. The same notation is also extended to sets of words:
α-1V =
{
α-1w | w ∈ V }.
We may now define an SDT:
Definition 5 (Symbolic Decision Tree). A Symbolic Decision Tree (SDT)
is a register automaton T = (L, l0,X , Γ, λ) where L and Γ form a tree rooted at
l0.
For location l of SDT T , we write T [l] to denote the subtree of T rooted at l.
An SDT that results from a tree query (u,w) (of a prefix word u and a symbolic
suffix w), is required to satisfy some canonical form, captured by the following
definition.
Definition 6 ((u,w)-tree). For any data word u with k actions and any sym-
bolic suffix w, a (u,w)-tree is an SDT T which has runs over all data words inJwK, and which satisfies the following restriction: whenever 〈l, α(p), g, pi, l′〉 is the
jth transition on some path from l0, then for each xi ∈ X (l′) we have either (i)
i < k + j and pi(xi) = xi, or (ii) i = k + j and pi(xi) = p.
If u = α(d1) · · ·αk(dk) is a data word then νu is the valuation of {x1, . . . , xk}
satisfying νu(xi) = di, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Using this definition, the notion of a tree
oracle, which accepts tree queries and returns SDTs, can be described as follows.
Definition 7 (Tree Oracle). A tree oracle for a structure S is a function O
which, for a data language L, prefix word u and symbolic suffix w returns a (u,w)-
tree O(L, u, w) s.t. for any word v ∈ JwK, the following holds: v is accepted by
O(L, u, w) under νu iff u · v ∈ L.
A tree oracle returns equality trees, defined below:
Definition 8 (Equality Tree). An equality tree for a tree query (u, V ) is a
(u, V )-tree T such that:
– for each action α, there is a potential set I ⊆ pot(u) of indices such that the
initial α-guards consist of the equalities of form p = xi for i ∈ I and one
disequality of form ∧i∈Ip 6= xi, and
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– for each initial transition 〈l0, α(p), g, l〉 of T , the tree T [l] is an equality tree
for (uα(dgu), α-1V ).
Cassel et al. [6] require their (equality trees) SDTs to be minimal (called
maximally abstract in [6]), i.e., the SDTs must not contain any redundancies
(such as Figure 4a). This can be achieved by checking if two sub-trees are equal
under some relabelling, and the process of constructing a tree by relabelling an
equality sub-tree is called specialisation of equality tree:
Definition 9 (Specialisation of equality tree). Let T be an equality tree for
prefix u and set of symbolic suffixes V , and let J ⊆ pot(u) be a set of indices.
Then T 〈J〉 denotes the equality tree for (u, V ) obtained from T by performing
the following transformations for each α:
– Whenever T has several initial α-transitions of form 〈l0, α(p), (p = xj), lj〉
with j ∈ J , then all subtrees of form (T [lj ])〈J [(k + 1) 7→ j]〉 for j ∈ J must
be defined and isomorphic, otherwise T 〈J〉 is undefined. If all such subtrees
are defined and isomorphic, then T 〈J〉 is obtained from T by
1. replacing all initial α-transitions of form 〈l0, α(p), (p = xj), lj〉 for j ∈ J
by the single transition 〈l0, α(p), (p = xm), lm〉 where m = max(J),
2. replacing T [lm] by (T [lm])〈J [(k + 1) 7→ m]〉, and
3. replacing all other subtrees T [l′] reached by initial α-transitions (which
have not been replaced in Step 1 by (T [l′])〈J〉.
If, for some α, any of the subtrees generated in Step 2 or 3 are undefined,
then T 〈J〉 is also undefined, otherwise T 〈J〉 is obtained after performing Steps
1− 3 for each α.
Definition 10 (Necessary Potential set for Tree Oracle). A necessary
potential set I for the root location l0 of an equality tree O(L, u, V ) is a subset
of pot(u) such that for each index i ∈ I the following holds:
1. O(L, uα(d0u), Vα)〈 {i, k + 1}〉 is undefined, or
2. O(L, uα(d0u), Vα)〈 {i, k + 1}〉 6' O(L, uα(di), Vα).
Intuitively, a necessary potential set contains indices of data values which
influence future behaviour of the SUT. Consequently, indices of data values
which do not influence the behaviour of the SUT are excluded from the necessary
potential set. We are now ready to define the tree oracle for equality:
Definition 11 (Tree oracle for equality). For a language L, a prefix u, and
the set of symbolic suffixes V , the equality tree O(L, u, V ) is constructed as follows:
– If V = {}, then O(L, u, {}) is the trivial tree with one location l0 and no
registers. It is accepting if the word is accpeted, i.e., λ(l0) = + if u ∈ L, else
λ(l0) = −. To determine u ∈ L, the tree oracle performs a membership query
on u.
– If V 6= {}, then for each α such that Vα = α-1V is non-empty,
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• let I be the necessary potential set (Definition 10),
• O(L, u, V ) is constructed as O(L, u, V ) = (L, l0, Γ, λ), where, letting
O(L, uα(di), Vα) be the tuple (Lαi , lα0i, Γαi , λαi ) for i ∈ (I ∪ {0}),
∗ L is the disjoint union of all Lαi plus an additional initial location l0,
∗ Γ is the union of all Γαi for i ∈ (I ∪ {0}), and in addition the
transitions of form 〈l0, α(p), gi, lα0i〉 with i ∈ (I ∪ {0}), where gi is∧
j∈I p 6= xj for i = 0, and gi is p = xi for i 6= 0, and
∗ λ agrees with each λαi on Lαi . Moreover, if  ∈ V , then λ(l0) = + if
u ∈ L, otherwise λ(l0) = −. Again, to determine whether u ∈ L, the
tree oracle performs a membership query for u.
Intuitively, O(L, u, V ) is constructed by joining the trees O(L, uα(di), Vα) with
guard p = xi for i ∈ I, and the tree O(L, uα(d0u), Vα) with guard
∧
i∈I p 6= xi,
as children of a new root. Note, while V is a set of symbolic suffixes, RALib
technically handles tree queries sequentially, i.e., as sequential tree queries of prefix
u and symbolic suffix w. Consequently, we treat the set of symbolic suffixes V
as a singleton, referred to as ‘w’.
O(L, u, w) is constructed bottom-up, recursively building new ‘roots’ at the
top with larger and larger symbolic suffixes (and consequently, shorter and shorter
prefixes). The choice of the necessary potential set I plays a crucial role: if I
is larger than necessary, O(L, u, w) contains redundant guards (and is hence a
‘non-minimal’ SDT).
We now have a clear goal for our proof: we must show that the SDT returned
by Algorithm 3 is isomorphic to the SDT returned by the tree oracle for equality
as defined in Definition 11 (under the assumption that the ‘set’ of symbolic
suffixes V is a singleton). We can divide our proof into the following steps:
1. We show that Algorithm 1 produces a characteristic predicate for tree query
(u,w), and contains all the information for constructing an equality tree,
2. Next, we show that Algorithm 2 guarantees that for potential set It of a
location lt of the tainted equality tree Tt, the potential set I of equivalent
location l of the normal equality tree T is a subset of It: I ⊆ It, and finally,
3. We can then reduce the make the tainted potential set equal to the normal
potential set (using Algorithm 3) and the resulting tainted equality tree will
be isomorphic to the normal equality tree.
Each of the above steps correspond to one of our algorithms. We now begin
with step 1: from Algorithm 1, we can state the following lemmas:
Lemma 1 (Characteristic Predicate). For a tree query (u,w), Algorithm 1
always produces a characteristic predicate H.
Proof. We recall that, under the test hypothesis, an SUT M is deterministic
and has a finite number of logically disjoint branches to be followed from each
state. Algorithm 1 initialises two variables G := > and H := ⊥. For each word
z = u · w under a valuation ν  G, we may perform a membership query on M .
Each query returns the guard I = ∧k+ni=k+1constraintsM (z)[i] such that ν  I and
the acceptance of the word z in the language of M , i.e., z ∈M .
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For each iteration of the do-while loop, the variable G is updated with the
negation of the previously-satisfied guard I, i.e., G := G ∧ ¬I. This guarantees
that any new valuation ν′ will not satisfy I, and hence, the next iteration of the
do-while loop shall induce a different run of M . Given that M only has a finite
number of logical branches, Algorithm 1 terminates.
We also know that for each tainted word z, we obtain the acceptance of
z ∈ L(M ). If z ∈ L(M ), the variable H is updated to H ∨ I. Therefore, the
predicate H returned by Algorithm 1 is the characteristic predicate for the tree
query (u,w). uunionsq
After constructing the characteristic predicate, we convert it to a non-minimal
SDT using Algorithm 2, providing us with the following lemma:
Lemma 2 (Non-minimal SDT). For any location lt of a non-minimal SDT
with an equivalent location l of a minimal SDT, the necessary potential set It of
the non-minimal SDT is a superset of the necessary potential set I of the minimal
SDT: I ⊆ It ⊆ pot(u) where pot(u) is the potential of the prefix u of locations lt
and l.
Proof. We know that I ⊆ pot(u) by definition of the necessary potential set.
For any word w = u · v where the prefix u leads to location lt of the tainted
non-minimal SDT, Algorithm 2 guarantees that the suffixes of u will be classified
correctly. If the suffixes are classified correctly, we derive that It ⊇ I (otherwise
the suffixes will not be classified correctly). Since It ⊇ I and I, It ⊆ pot(u), we
conclude I ⊆ It ⊆ pot(u). uunionsq
Following Lemma 2, if we wish to make I = It, we can simply remove all
elements from It which do not satisfy the conditions outlined in Definition 10.
Since we already know that I ⊆ It, we can confirm that after removal of all
irrelevant parameters, I = It. Algorithm 3 accomplishes the same.
Cassel et al. [6] use the concept of representative data values for constructing
the SDT, while we treat the values symbolically: a representative data value
‘represents’ the set of data values that satisfy a guard during construction of
the SDT; in our case, we simply let Z3 decide on all the values to use for our
membership queries and obtain the guards about them using their taint markers
as identifiers.
Theorem 1 (Isomorphism of tree oracles). The SDTs generated by the
tainted tree oracle and the untainted tree oracle for a tree query (u,w) are iso-
morphic.
Proof. Lemma 1 guarantees that Algorithm 1 returns a characteristic predicate
H for the tree query (u,w). Application of Algorithm 2 on H constructs a non-
minimal SDT. Using Lemma 2 and Algorithm 3 on the non-minimal SDT, we can
conclude that the root locations of the tainted tree oracle and normal tree oracle
have the same necessary potential set. By inductive reasoning on the depth of
the trees, the same holds for all sub-trees of both oracles, eventually reducing to
the leaves, showing that the tainted tree oracle is isomorphic to tree oracle. uunionsq
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Appendix B Detailed Benchmark results
Table 1 contains the full results of the values used to create the plots from Fig-
ure 6.
Table 1: Benchmarks
Model Tree Oracle EQ Oracle Learn Symbols Test Symbols Total Symbols Learned
(Std. Dev) (Std. Dev) (Std. Dev)
Abp Output Tainted Normal 6.55E+02 1.57E+05 1.58E+05 30/30
(8.33E+01) (1.29E+05) (1.29E+05)
Abp Output Tainted Tainted 6.17E+02 1.68E+04 1.74E+04 30/30
(7.78E+01) (1.15E+04) (1.15E+04)
Abp Output Normal Normal 6.93E+03 1.57E+05 1.64E+05 30/30
(5.20E+03) (1.29E+05) (1.29E+05)
Abp Output Normal Tainted 6.51E+03 1.68E+04 2.33E+04 30/30
(3.97E+03) (1.15E+04) (1.29E+04)
Lock 2 Tainted Normal N-A N-A N-A 0/30
(N-A) (N-A) (N-A)
Lock 2 Tainted Tainted 7.10E+01 1.15E+03 1.22E+03 30/30
(0.00E+00) (6.76E+02) (6.76E+02)
Lock 2 Normal Normal N-A N-A N-A 0/30
(N-A) (N-A) (N-A)
Lock 2 Normal Tainted 2.00E+02 1.15E+03 1.35E+03 30/30
(0.00E+00) (6.76E+02) (6.76E+02)
Lock 4 Tainted Normal N-A N-A N-A 0/30
(N-A) (N-A) (N-A)
Lock 4 Tainted Tainted 2.41E+02 6.29E+03 6.53E+03 30/30
(0.00E+00) (5.52E+03) (5.52E+03)
Lock 4 Normal Normal N-A N-A N-A 0/30
(N-A) (N-A) (N-A)
Lock 4 Normal Tainted 3.45E+04 6.29E+03 4.08E+04 30/30
(0.00E+00) (5.52E+03) (5.52E+03)
Lock 5 Tainted Normal N-A N-A N-A 0/30
(N-A) (N-A) (N-A)
Lock 5 Tainted Tainted 3.80E+02 2.62E+04 2.66E+04 30/30
(0.00E+00) (1.45E+04) (1.45E+04)
Lock 5 Normal Normal N-A N-A N-A 0/30
(N-A) (N-A) (N-A)
Lock 5 Normal Tainted 6.35E+05 2.62E+04 6.61E+05 30/30
(0.00E+00) (1.45E+04) (1.45E+04)
Continued on next page
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Table 1: Benchmarks
Model Tree Oracle EQ Oracle Learn Symbols Test Symbols Total Symbols Learned
(Std. Dev) (Std. Dev) (Std. Dev)
Fifo 01 Tainted Normal 2.90E+01 1.71E+01 4.62E+01 30/30
(4.08E+00) (6.12E+00) (6.73E+00)
Fifo 01 Tainted Tainted 2.97E+01 1.38E+01 4.35E+01 30/30
(3.83E+00) (3.58E+00) (4.93E+00)
Fifo 01 Normal Normal 6.65E+01 1.71E+01 8.37E+01 30/30
(1.84E+01) (6.12E+00) (1.80E+01)
Fifo 01 Normal Tainted 7.07E+01 1.38E+01 8.46E+01 30/30
(1.74E+01) (3.58E+00) (1.68E+01)
Fifo 02 Tainted Normal 1.16E+02 6.47E+01 1.81E+02 30/30
(3.26E+01) (2.77E+01) (4.28E+01)
Fifo 02 Tainted Tainted 1.01E+02 5.10E+01 1.52E+02 30/30
(3.03E+01) (1.55E+01) (3.31E+01)
Fifo 02 Normal Normal 3.62E+02 6.47E+01 4.27E+02 30/30
(1.29E+02) (2.77E+01) (1.33E+02)
Fifo 02 Normal Tainted 3.50E+02 5.10E+01 4.01E+02 30/30
(1.48E+02) (1.55E+01) (1.49E+02)
Fifo 03 Tainted Normal 3.03E+02 1.34E+02 4.38E+02 30/30
(8.53E+01) (5.84E+01) (9.39E+01)
Fifo 03 Tainted Tainted 2.93E+02 1.05E+02 3.98E+02 30/30
(8.54E+01) (4.69E+01) (8.07E+01)
Fifo 03 Normal Normal 1.64E+03 1.34E+02 1.78E+03 30/30
(9.00E+02) (5.84E+01) (8.82E+02)
Fifo 03 Normal Tainted 1.93E+03 1.05E+02 2.03E+03 30/30
(1.34E+03) (4.69E+01) (1.31E+03)
Fifo 04 Tainted Normal 6.87E+02 2.20E+02 9.06E+02 30/30
(1.51E+02) (1.11E+02) (2.14E+02)
Fifo 04 Tainted Tainted 6.35E+02 1.62E+02 7.96E+02 30/30
(1.41E+02) (7.53E+01) (1.53E+02)
Fifo 04 Normal Normal 1.22E+04 2.20E+02 1.24E+04 30/30
(1.22E+04) (1.11E+02) (1.22E+04)
Fifo 04 Normal Tainted 1.19E+04 1.62E+02 1.20E+04 30/30
(1.21E+04) (7.53E+01) (1.21E+04)
Fifo 05 Tainted Normal 1.23E+03 3.53E+02 1.58E+03 30/30
(3.35E+02) (2.13E+02) (4.49E+02)
Fifo 05 Tainted Tainted 1.32E+03 2.24E+02 1.54E+03 29/30
(2.88E+02) (9.79E+01) (3.14E+02)
Fifo 05 Normal Normal 1.00E+05 3.19E+02 1.01E+05 25/30
Continued on next page
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Table 1: Benchmarks
Model Tree Oracle EQ Oracle Learn Symbols Test Symbols Total Symbols Learned
(Std. Dev) (Std. Dev) (Std. Dev)
(1.84E+05) (1.67E+02) (1.84E+05)
Fifo 05 Normal Tainted 1.28E+05 2.35E+02 1.28E+05 25/30
(2.08E+05) (8.76E+01) (2.08E+05)
Repetition Tainted Normal N-A N-A N-A 0/30
(N-A) (N-A) (N-A)
Repetition Tainted Tainted 1.22E+02 7.33E+03 7.45E+03 30/30
(0.00E+00) (2.03E+03) (2.03E+03)
Repetition Normal Normal N-A N-A N-A 0/30
(N-A) (N-A) (N-A)
Repetition Normal Tainted 8.90E+03 7.33E+03 1.62E+04 30/30
(1.99E+03) (2.03E+03) (2.26E+03)
Set 01 Tainted Normal 1.45E+02 1.28E+03 1.43E+03 29/30
(1.03E+02) (1.52E+03) (1.52E+03)
Set 01 Tainted Tainted 9.75E+01 1.83E+02 2.80E+02 30/30
(3.56E+01) (1.61E+02) (1.56E+02)
Set 01 Normal Normal 5.00E+06 1.28E+03 5.01E+06 29/30
(1.73E+07) (1.52E+03) (1.73E+07)
Set 01 Normal Tainted 2.96E+03 1.83E+02 3.15E+03 30/30
(6.71E+03) (1.61E+02) (6.69E+03)
Set 02 Tainted Normal 1.61E+03 8.21E+03 9.82E+03 28/30
(9.96E+02) (1.26E+04) (1.24E+04)
Set 02 Tainted Tainted 1.00E+03 2.21E+02 1.23E+03 29/30
(3.26E+02) (2.14E+02) (3.68E+02)
Set 02 Normal Normal 4.61E+06 8.60E+03 4.62E+06 25/30
(1.43E+07) (1.31E+04) (1.43E+07)
Set 02 Normal Tainted 4.35E+04 2.20E+02 4.37E+04 30/30
(7.28E+04) (2.10E+02) (7.29E+04)
Set 03 Tainted Normal 1.76E+04 5.01E+03 2.26E+04 24/30
(8.71E+03) (9.51E+03) (1.40E+04)
Set 03 Tainted Tainted 1.44E+04 6.91E+02 1.51E+04 30/30
(5.05E+03) (8.76E+02) (4.95E+03)
Set 03 Normal Normal 5.76E+06 3.94E+03 5.76E+06 14/30
(1.47E+07) (6.48E+03) (1.47E+07)
Set 03 Normal Tainted 2.01E+06 2.23E+02 2.01E+06 28/30
(3.60E+06) (2.06E+02) (3.60E+06)
Sip 2015 Tainted Normal 2.14E+03 1.89E+05 1.92E+05 10/30
(4.00E+02) (2.60E+05) (2.60E+05)
Continued on next page
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Table 1: Benchmarks
Model Tree Oracle EQ Oracle Learn Symbols Test Symbols Total Symbols Learned
(Std. Dev) (Std. Dev) (Std. Dev)
Sip 2015 Tainted Tainted 2.30E+03 3.18E+04 3.41E+04 29/30
(3.13E+02) (1.59E+04) (1.59E+04)
Sip 2015 Normal Normal 1.57E+05 2.07E+05 3.65E+05 9/30
(4.42E+05) (2.69E+05) (4.81E+05)
Sip 2015 Normal Tainted 1.47E+05 3.18E+04 1.79E+05 29/30
(2.80E+05) (1.59E+04) (2.78E+05)
